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Abstract 
 
We examine whether religious priming can induce more truthful preference revelation in 
valuation research. Using induced value second price Vickrey auctions in both hypothetical 
and non-hypothetical contexts, our results suggest that religious priming can indeed induce 
more truthful bidding and eliminate hypothetical bias in hypothetical contexts. In non-
hypothetical contexts where there are real economic incentives, religious priming induces 
similar truthful bidding as the absence of religious priming, implying that the use of real 
economic incentives is sufficient in producing truthful valuations. Our findings have 
significant implications for the use of religious priming in stated preference or contingent 
valuation studies.   
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I. Introduction 
Eliciting people’s preferences and valuations for various goods has been central in the 
economics literature. However, the gap between real and hypothetical valuations remains a 
big challenge for applied practitioners and is the predominant concern in stated preferences 
methods. Evidence from the field and the lab show that people tend to misrepresent their 
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preferences (i.e., usually overstate their values) when there are no real economic 
commitments. For example, several experimental studies showed that hypothetical referenda 
were likely to generate biases in the estimation of willingness to pay (WTP) values 
(Cummings, et al., 1997). A meta-analysis of 29 experimental studies by List and Gallet 
(2001) revealed that subjects on average overstate their preferences by a factor of 3 in 
hypothetical settings. Little and Berrens (2004) reconfirmed these results of List and Gallet 
using an expanded sample of studies. Given the generally robust findings on hypothetical 
bias in stated preference studies, the validity of WTP results, particularly from contingent 
valuation (CV), has been questioned and has been an important area of research in the 
economics literature.  
Evidence of hypothetical bias are widespread in the literature. For example, Burton et 
al. (2007) and Mozumder and Berrens (2007) found evidence of hypothetical bias in induced 
value experiments. Neill  et al. (1994) concludes that hypothetical values have little 
predictive power since the ratio of hypothetical to actual bids was 9.1 in their study. Loomis 
et al. (1996) have shown that hypothetical willingness to pay is significantly greater than 
actual willingness to pay, with differences hovering between 9:1 and 1.8:1. There are, 
however, exceptions. For example, Vossler and McKee’s (2006) findings support the notion 
that hypothetical bias might not arise in induced values contexts and that decisions do not 
vary systematically when payment is hypothetical or real. More recently, Jacquemet et al. 
(2011) using French subjects found no evidence of hypothetical bias in induced value 
hypothetical contexts as compared to a context with real monetary incentives.  
 
 Our aim in this study is to test whether exposure to religious concepts could activate 
honesty among subjects and in turn mitigate hypothetical bias in valuation or WTP studies. 
Our basic premise is that motivation to respond honestly or truthfully can be primed through 
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exposure to words related to religiousness. Psychologists call the technique that implicitly 
stimulates certain behaviors as “priming”. Priming refers to an increased sensitivity to certain 
stimuli due to prior experience and activation of particular representations or associations in 
memory. Psychologists have found that stereotyping behavior can be stimulated by priming a 
social category. For example, Bargh et al. (1996) primed participants with elderly stereotype 
and then observed that these subjects walked more slowly down the hall as compared to a 
control group. Bargh et al. (2001) also showed that participants who have been incidentally 
exposed to certain words that activated the goal to perform well actually performed better on 
subsequent tasks. Several studies in the psychology literature have primed subjects in 
experiments with various concepts including soccer hooliganism and stupidity (Dijksterhuis 
& van Knippenberg, 1998),  religiosity (Johnson, et al., 2010), honesty (Rasinski, et al., 
2005), affiliation  (Over & Carpenter, 2009), and conformity (Epley & Gilovich, 1999). 
In this paper we examine whether religious priming could reduce hypothetical bias in 
an induced value second-price auction. We hypothesize that subjects primed into religiosity 
will activate norms toward honesty and thus reveal their preferences sincerely. Religious 
priming has been shown to influence self-evaluation concerns (Balwin, 1990) as well as 
honesty (Randolf-Seng & Nielsen, 2007) as evidenced by less cheating in a subsequent task. 
Priming can be either supraliminal (conscious) or subliminal (nonconcious).  In our study, we 
used a subliminal type of priming technique where participants were given a “scrambled 
sentence test”. Scrambled Sentence Test priming techniques have been used by researchers 
(Srull & Wyer, 1979) in the past to activate either the goal of impression formation or of 
memorization. In this priming task, participants constructed grammatically correct sentences 
out of sets of five words presented in a scrambled order. In our study, participants were asked 
to make grammatically correct sentences out of the set of words given to them.   
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In addition to testing whether religious priming can reduce hypothetical bias in WTP 
studies, we also explore whether religious priming affects either all people or only those who 
consider themselves religious. The induced value setting provides the opportunity to use the 
results from non-priming treatments as a benchmark and in turn observe whether behavior is 
consistent with the benchmark across different treatments. 
  
II. Religion and preference elicitation 
The impact of religion on human lives is evident throughout history. More recently, 
some scholars have paid closer attention to the issue of religious beliefs and consumers’ 
preferences. Here, we define religion as a belief system which includes God and/or a 
supernatural being (Bernardin, 2006). Religiosity then, can be defined as a belief in God 
accompanied by a commitment to follow certain principles set by God (McDaniel & Burnett, 
1990). Religions contain plenty of rules, norms and prohibitions that believers are asked to 
respect; hence religion provides perspective norms about what to do and when to do it 
(Silberman, 2005). The cornerstone of religious orthodoxy is the reference to an external 
authority in order to influence people’ attitudes (Deconchy, 1980).  
So, can religion influence preference elicitation? Effects of religion on individual 
consumer behaviour have been identified in several psychological studies. Religiousness 
tends to espouse values such as charity, honesty and tolerance, especially towards fellow 
adherents (Schoenfed, 1978). For example, religious individuals are more likely to respond to 
an appeal for charity than non-religious individuals (Malhotra, 2010). 
Argyle (2000) showed that religious people are more prone to prosocial behaviour in 
religious contexts such as towards fellow church members or church donations. Shariff and 
Norenzayan (2007)  also found that religious primes increased prosocial behavior in an 
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anonymous Dictator game. Perrin (2000) suggests that religiosity effects are stronger when 
people self-report prosocial behavior or feel that others might be watching. They also found 
that religious college students cheat less when given the opportunity to be dishonest. 
Similarly, Mazar  et al. (2008) found that drawing people’s attention to moral standards can 
reduce dishonest behavior. Other studies have found a negative link between religiousness 
and cheating on income taxes (Grasmick, et al., 1991). Pichon et al. (2007) examined the 
impact of priming religious concepts on prosocial behavior and found that prosocial 
intentions were stronger when people had been previously subliminally primed.  
Benjamin  et al. (2010) studied the effect of religious primes in a series of economic 
games including a public goods game, a dictator game, risk/time preference tasks and labor 
market tasks. They found significant effects for contributions in the public good game, risk 
aversion and labor market reciprocity but none on discount rates and on altruistic generosity. 
They also found that results differ between religious groups such as Protestants, Catholics 
and Jews. Similar effects were found in Ahmed and Salas (2008) where implicit priming of 
religious concepts significantly increased prosocial behavior in Dictator and Prisoner’s 
Dilemma games. In a quasi-experimental study, Ahmed (2009) found that highly devout 
students who were preparing to enter the clergy were significantly more cooperative in a 
public goods game and were significantly more generous in a dictator game than other 
students. 
In addition, research has shown that religious representations can influence behaviour 
even if these were not related to intrinsic religiosity, level of devotion or belief in God. For 
instance, Randolf-Seng and Nielsen (2007) found that participants with primed religious 
representations cheated significantly less in a subsequent task while participant’s  intrinsic 
religious orientation had no influence on rates of cheating. Shariff and Norenzayan (2007) 
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could not associate a trait measure of self-reported religiosity with prosocial behavior which, 
on the other hand, was significantly influenced by religious primes. A more recent study 
showed that overall level of religiosity was unrelated to cheating as well but that viewing 
God as a more angry and punishing agent predicted more honest behavior (Shariff & 
Norenzayan, 2011).  
In summary, religion has been found to be associated with several types of prosocial 
behaviour such as honesty, trust, and cooperation, which are at the heart of most religions’ 
doctrines. Thus, the issue of hypothetical bias provides an important motivation for the 
testing and application of religious priming in economic valuation research.  
 
III. Experimental design 
Overview 
In light of the above cited findings, the main research question we would like to 
address is whether religious priming can lead to more sincere preference revelation in 
valuation research. Since we conduct an induced value experiment, by sincere bidding we 
refer to bids that are close to induced values. Our subjects took part in a multi-round auction 
in which they submitted bids for their assigned induced values under real (i.e., non-
hypothetical) and hypothetical treatments. Prior to the auction, we carefully explained how a 
second price auction works. For the induced value procedure, we sold an unspecified “good” 
and resold it to the experimenter at the market clearing price (2nd highest bid) at the end of 
the procedure. Our induced value auction experiment closely follows the procedures used by 
Jacquemet  et al. (2010) and Shogren et al. (2001).  
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We examine how religious priming affects bidding behavior in induced value 
auctions using the following treatments: (1) hypothetical auction without religious priming, 
(2) hypothetical auction with religious priming, (3) hypothetical auction with neutral 
priming, (4) non-hypothetical auction without religious priming, (5) non-hypothetical auction 
with religious priming, and (6) non-hypothetical auction with neutral priming. Neutral 
priming treatments are necessary to ensure that effects do not arise purely due to the nature of 
the descrambling task but rather due to activation of religious representations. With the 
exception of the participants in treatments (1) and (4), subjects were either exposed to a set of 
neutral words (in the neutral priming treatments) or to a combination of neutral words and 
religion-related words (in the religious priming treatments) prior the conduct of the induced 
value auctions. At the end of the auctions session, participants were then asked to complete a 
questionnaire containing a series of questions about personal attitudes, religiosity, and 
demographics. Table 1 exhibits our experimental design.  
 
Experimental procedures 
 We only used one proctor (i.e., one of the authors) for all sessions. A conventional lab 
experiment was conducted using the z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007) . Subjects consisted 
of undergraduate students at XX university (removed for peer review; to be adjusted upon 
publication) and were recruited using the ORSEE recruiting system (Greiner, 2004). The 
nature of the experiment was not mentioned during the recruitment. Each subject participated 
in one session only. The size of the groups was exactly 8 subjects per session. Each subject in 
every round was endowed with a different induced value. The sets of induced values were 
randomly drawn from 8 values. The induced demand curve is identical in all treatments and 
is defined by: {1.68, 2.84, 3.41, 4.26, 5.49, 6.62, 7.23, 8.70}. All monetary values are 
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expressed in Euros (€). The auction was repeated eight times (i.e., 8 rounds) permitting all 
possible permutations among individual induced values. Each bidder experienced each 
induced value once, and the entire demand curve was induced in every round. None of the 
bidders knew anything about the other bidders’ induced value or the induced demand curve. 
(Hypothetical) profits in the (hypothetical) real treatments are equal to the difference between 
the induced value and the price the winning bidder pays for the good (the second highest 
bid). If a bidder did not purchase the good, profits were zero for that round. The only 
information posted between rounds was the loss/profit of the previous round, if any. Each 
session lasted less than an hour. In total, 96 subjects participated in our six treatments.  
Each session consisted of different phases: the training phase, the priming 
manipulation phase (except for the non-priming treatment), the auction phase and the post-
auction phase. After arriving at the lab, subjects were randomly assigned to a computer. In 
both the real and hypothetical treatments, each subject received a 5€ show-up fee and a 10€ 
participation fee. All transactions were completed at the end of the experiment. We made 
clear to participants in the hypothetical treatments that payments were fixed while 
participants in the real treatments were told that that their payments depend on their 
decisions. Before the actual auction, subjects were given detailed instructions on how a 
second price auction works and a numerical example of how bids will be sorted.  Subjects 
also participated in a practice auction (i.e., hypothetical two-round induced value auction) to 
fully familiarize themselves with the procedure.   
 
Priming manipulation phase 
This phase was administered in all the treatments except the no-priming treatments, 
just before the eight-round auction took place. Subjects were provided a paper and pencil 
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word-descrambling task and were given an example of how this task works and what do they 
have to do. The task presented subjects with a series of 10 scrambled sentences. Each 
sentence consisted of five words. Subjects were then told that their task was to read each 
scrambled sentence carefully and form a sentence that makes sense by deleting one of the 
words. In the religious priming treatments, participants were presented with 10 sentences, 
half of which contained words related to religion (i.e., spirit, divine, God, sacred, prophets). 
Participants in neutral priming treatments were presented with the same task except that the 
five religion related sentences were replaced with neutral sentences unrelated to 
religiousness. Appendix A illustrates the religious priming manipulation procedure. These 
scrambling sentence tasks have been used in Inzlicht and Tullett (2010) and Shariff and 
Norenzayan (2007)  to prime religiosity. 
As is standard practice in experiments of implicit priming manipulation, subjects 
were asked after the end of the experiment if they noticed “a theme” in the words to which 
they were initially exposed. All subjects reported unawareness of the goal-activation 
manipulation. 
 
IV. Results 
Descriptive analysis 
We first consider aggregate behavior by round in each treatment. Table 2 provides 
raw data on observed behavior by treatment and round. In each treatment, aggregate 
induced demand (ID) equals 80.46€ (this is the sum of induced values). Table 2 shows the 
aggregate revealed demand (RD) which equals the sum of observed bids as well as the ratio 
of RD/ID in percentage points. Figure 1 illustrates the RD/ID ratio graphically. The red 
solid line signifies perfect demand revelation and is the benchmark. It is evident from Table 
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2 and Figure 1 that there is a significant difference between the hypothetical and real no 
priming treatments (standard induced value auctions). When real monetary incentives are 
introduced, average demand revelation drops significantly from 143.5% to 102.1%, which 
is almost perfectly demand revealing. Table 3 summarizes aggregate bidding behavior by 
treatment and induced value. Demand revelation improves in both hypothetical and real 
treatments with increased induced values.  
A similar picture can be drawn from Table 4 which shows the summary statistics of 
experimental data. In the no-priming conditions, mean bids in the real treatments were only 
slightly larger than mean induced values by 0.10€ (S.D.=2.55€) while the ratio of bids to 
induced values is 1.04. On the other hand, mean bids in the hypothetical treatments are 
2.19€ larger than mean induced values (S.D.=2.91) and the ratio of bids to induced values 
is 1.51. Figure 2 shows the distribution of bids by treatment. Solid lines represent perfect 
demand revelation. It is evident that when there is no priming, there is a higher dispersion 
with hypothetical bids than with real bids. Bids in the real treatment are distributed around 
the solid line. 
The significant difference between real and hypothetical treatments in the no-priming 
condition demonstrates the existence of hypothetical bias. Results suggest then that 
monetary incentives are enough to eliminate this bias; however in practice this is not 
always feasible in the field (e.g., when dealing with non-market goods or with market 
goods that have not been developed yet). So can religious concepts induce honesty and thus 
more honest answers? The corresponding rows in Table 3 show that priming religiousness 
can indeed improve demand revelation in the hypothetical context since aggregate demand 
revelation drops from an average of 143.5% in hypothetical without religious priming to 
133.8% in hypothetical with religious priming.  This improvement in more truthful demand 
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revelation is, however, still far from the almost perfect demand revelation of 102.1% 
achieved in the non-hypothetical without priming treatment. To examine whether it is the 
priming task alone that causes this effect, we compare these findings with those in the 
neutral priming treatment. We can see that this is not the case since the neutral primes 
hardly caused any change in the aggregate demand revelation in the hypothetical treatments 
(i.e., 143.5% under no priming and 143.9% under neutral priming). 
The picture is quite different for the non-hypothetical treatments with priming. 
Religious priming and neutral priming are on aggregate better demand revealing as 
compared to the hypothetical treatments (i.e., 129.2% for religious priming and 128.9% for 
neutral priming compared to 133.8% and 143.9% for the hypothetical treatment 
counterparts, respectively) but not as good as the non-hypothetical with no-priming 
treatment. So what does this mean? We can only speculate but we believe that this result 
might be due to a clash between religious norms and market norms. For example, Gneezy 
and Rustichini (2000)  conducted an experiment in a group of day-care centers in Israel 
where parents were coming later than the due time to collect their children. In one group 
they introduced a fine for late arrival. The fine, however, had a long-term negative effect; 
parents chose to be late more often. Once the fine was removed the behavior of the parents 
did not change – they continued to pick up their children late. Ariely (2009) discussed how 
these findings support the fact that we live in two worlds: the world of social norms and the 
world of market norms. Whenever market norms are introduced into the world of social 
norms, relationships are disturbed and recovering from it may be difficult. 
A similar explanation might be in place with our data as well. From our data it looks 
like when religious norms collide with market norms, market norms partially go away. We 
say partially because demand revelation improves when compared to the hypothetical 
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treatment but is worse than the non-hypothetical no-priming treatment. Table 4 indicates 
that mean bids in the real religious priming treatment differ by 1.47€ (S.D.=2.92) from 
mean induced values while the difference in the hypothetical treatment is 1.70 (S.D.=3.69). 
However, demand revelation in both treatments is far worse than demand revelation under 
monetary incentives alone. 
 
Econometric analysis 
By specifying the bidding function as linear in induced value, we can directly test the 
assumption of perfect revealing bids. 
0 1it it t i itbid b b IV u         (1) 
In (1) itbid is subject i’s bid in round t, itIV  denotes subject i’s induced value in round t, t are 
fixed round effects, iu  are individual specific random effects and it  is a period specific error 
term. Wald tests of 0 0 1:  b 0,  b 1,  ρ 0tH     can provide a formal test of perfectly demand 
revealing bids. Econometric results of model (1) are displayed in Table 5 while Wald tests 
are displayed in Table 6. Equation (1) can easily be extended to account for demographics. 
We reach similar conclusions when demographics are added. Results are exhibited in 
Appendix B.1 
With respect to the hypothetical treatments, Table 6 shows that we reject the null of 
perfectly demand revealing bids for the case of no priming or neutral priming. However, we 
cannot reject the null in the treatments where we primed subjects with religious concepts. 
Consistent with the picture drawn from Figures 1 and 2, religious primes seemed to have 
                                                 
1 A one-way analysis of variance for age (F-stat=0.69, p-value=0.63) and Fisher’s exact tests for gender (p-
value=0.26), income (p-value=0.41) and household size (p-value=0.38) indicate there are no statistically 
significant differences between treatments, thus we would not expect a significant influence of demographics on 
our results. 
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induced more sincere bidding behavior in a hypothetical valuation context. When it comes to 
the treatments with real economic incentives (i.e., non-hypothetical treatments), our results 
suggest that neutral priming does not induce sincere bidding. We could not reject the null of 
perfect demand revelation however for both the no priming as well as the religious priming 
conditions. In summary, our results based on our econometric analysis imply that religious 
priming helps improve demand revelation or truthful bidding in hypothetical contexts but is 
not needed in non-hypothetical contexts.  
To further explore the role of religiousness in deviations from induced values and to 
examine whether belonging in a specific dogma or being an atheist has a differential effect 
on the priming treatments, we regressed the absolute difference between bids and induced 
values on a variety of religiosity measures. We asked subjects in all our sessions to indicate 
the religious dogma they belong to with options ranging from Christian Orthodox, to other 
Christian denomination, to atheist or none of the above. We also asked our subjects to 
indicate the extent to which they believe in a God on a 7-point likert scale. About 65% of our 
subjects indicated being a Christian Orthodox and scored four or higher on the 7-point likert 
scale asking whether they believe in a God. Subjects who indicated that they are atheist or 
who scored less than four on the 7-point likert scale asking whether they believe in a God 
were classified as atheists (Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007).  To measure religiosity, we asked 
subjects to indicate the importance of God in their life, importance of religion on their life as 
well as how often they pray on a 7-point likert scale. We then formed a measure of personal 
religiousness following Saroglou, et al. (2009) . Finally, to form a measure of religious 
donations, we used data on a question asking subjects whether they had donated any money 
to religious organization or church during the past year (McKay, et al., 2010). We estimated 
a random effects regression of the form: 
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0 1 2 3 4
5 6
7 8
9 10
11 12
it it t
b b Hyp b NeutPr b ReligPr b Hyp ReligPr
b Hyp NeutPr b Religiousness
bid IV b ReligPr Religiousness b Christian v
b ReligPr Christian b Atheist
b ReligPr Atheist b Donation

                        
i ite   (2) 
In (2) iv  are individual specific random effects and ite  is a period specific error term. Hyp is 
a dummy indicating the hypothetical treatment, NeutPr is a dummy for the neutral priming 
treatment, ReligPr is dummy for the religious priming treatment and Religiousness, 
Christian, Atheist, Donation are the religiosity measures described above. We also included 
several interaction terms to check whether religiosity measures have a differential effect 
between treatments. 
Table 7 exhibits regression results. We find that in all cases, religiosity measures 
cannot explain discrepancies between bids and induced values. Thus, we can be confident 
that the differences on demand revelation we observed between the treatments can be solely 
attributed to the treatment alone and not on differences on individual religious traits.  
 
V. Conclusions 
 
In this article, we tested the impact of priming religious concepts as a truth telling 
device in eliciting consumer preferences. In our experiments we subliminally primed 
subjects with religious concepts under both hypothetical as well as real economic 
incentives. Our results suggest that monetary incentives are adequate in eliminating 
hypothetical bias. However, since financial incentives are not always possible in empirical 
practice, we find that priming religiousness can improve demand revelation in hypothetical 
contexts. All in all, we observed that induced religiosity can be as effective as real 
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monetary incentives in inducing bids that are close to induced values in the context of a 
second price Vickrey auction. We also show that the results are not due to differences in 
religiosity traits between subjects.  
Our results are important since in many valuation studies it is not always feasible to 
place individuals in a truth telling context (e.g., with real monetary incentives).  Our findings 
generally suggest that subliminal religious primes could eliminate hypothetical bias in 
hypothetical valuation studies. Hence, our findings may open new avenues in non-market 
valuation research. Another interesting venue would be to examine how priming techniques 
may affect efficiency in games of cooperation or bargaining in the absence of monetary 
incentives. 
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Table 1. Experimental design 
 
 No priming Neutral 
priming 
Religious 
priming 
Real (2 sessions) x 
(8 subjects) 
(2 sessions) x 
(8 subjects) 
(2 sessions) x 
(8 subjects) 
Hypothetical  (2 sessions) x 
(8 subjects) 
(2 sessions) x 
(8 subjects) 
(2 sessions) x 
(8 subjects) 
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Table 2. Induced value bidding behavior by treatment and round 
 
 
   Round      
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Total 
Aggregate demand 80.46 80.46 80.46 80.46 80.46 80.46 80.46 80.46 643.68 
Treatments          
Hypothetical 
No primes 102.84 101.83 121.49 120.36 122.94 103.52 120.33 130.28 923.59 
(%) 127.82 126.56 150.99 149.59 152.80 128.66 149.55 161.92 143.49 
Religious primes 98.33 97.79 106.41 118.69 117.49 119.34 109.62 93.27 860.94 
(%) 122.21 121.54 132.25 147.51 146.02 148.32 136.24 115.92 133.75 
Neutral primes 109.74 113.80 112.42 111.90 113.02 124.03 117.99 123.24 926.14 
(%) 136.39 141.44 139.72 139.08 140.47 154.15 146.64 153.17 143.88 
Real 
No primes 77.09 79.95 87.79 84.25 78.65 85.13 80.49 83.67 657.02 
(%) 95.81 99.37 109.11 104.71 97.75 105.80 100.04 103.99 102.07 
Religious primes 100.93 99.76 104.43 96.66 101.19 112.79 104.13 111.72 831.61 
(%) 125.44 123.99 129.79 120.13 125.76 140.18 129.42 138.85 129.20 
Neutral primes 96.58 90.11 99.78 108.39 111.57 112.89 99.05 111.60 829.97 
(%) 120.03 111.99 124.01 134.71 138.67 140.31 123.10 138.70 128.94 
Notes: The aggregate demand row shows the aggregate induced demand (sum of induced values). For each treatment the upper row gives the 
aggregate revealed demand (sum of bids) in each round (in columns) and across all rounds (in last column). The lower figure (the % row) 
gives the ratio of the revealed demand to the aggregate induced demand. 
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Table 3. Induced value bidding behavior by treatment and induced value 
 
Induced value  
1.68 2.84 3.41 4.26 5.49 6.62 7.23 8.70 Total 
Aggregate demand 26.88 45.44 54.56 68.16 87.84 105.92 115.68 139.2 643.68 
Treatments          
Hypothetical 
No primes 52.93 72.08 82.21 93.94 134.32 148.92 160.83 178.36 923.59 
(%) 196.91 158.63 150.68 137.82 152.91 140.60 139.03 128.13 143.49 
Religious primes 37.57 57.64 89.88 105.43 106.65 130.72 172.88 160.17 860.94 
(%) 139.77 126.85 164.74 154.68 121.41 123.41 149.45 115.06 133.75 
Neutral primes 57.99 66.41 78.56 108.23 126.31 145.83 155.09 187.72 926.14 
(%) 215.74 146.15 143.99 158.79 143.80 137.68 134.07 134.86 143.88 
Real 
No primes 33.56 44.27 57.77 67.27 85.09 114.80 110.85 143.41 657.02 
(%) 124.85 97.43 105.88 98.69 96.87 108.38 95.82 103.02 102.07 
Religious primes 54.64 65.40 69.01 94.48 117.46 120.13 142.09 168.40 831.61 
(%) 203.27 143.93 126.48 138.62 133.72 113.42 122.83 120.98 129.20 
Neutral primes 49.87 73.35 68.50 89.59 112.74 128.61 142.02 165.29 829.97 
(%) 185.53 161.42 125.55 131.44 128.35 121.42 122.77 118.74 128.94 
Notes: The first row shows the induced values assigned to subjects. The second row shows the aggregate induced demand in each treatment 
(induced value x 16). For each treatment the upper row gives the aggregate revealed demand (sum of bids) for each assigned induced value 
(in columns) and across all induced values (in last column). The lower figure (the % row) gives the ratio of the revealed demand to the 
aggregate induced demand. 
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics 
 Treatments 
 Hypothetical Real 
 No primes Religious primes 
Neutral 
primes No primes
Religious 
primes Neutral primes 
 Mean  bid (sd) 
Bid 7.22 6.73 7.24 5.13 6.50 6.48 
 (3.93) (4.50) (3.80) (3.39) (3.73) (3.71) 
IV 5.03 5.03 5.03 5.03 5.03 5.03 
 (2.25) (2.25) (2.25) (2.25) (2.25) (2.25) 
Bid-IV 2.19 1.70 2.21 0.10 1.47 1.46 
 (2.91) (3.69) (2.71) (2.55) (2.92) (2.88) 
Bid-to-IV 1.51 1.37 1.52 1.04 1.38 1.37 
 (0.70) (0.84) (0.64) (0.56) (0.92) (0.80) 
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Table 5. Random effects regressions 
 Hypothetical Real 
Variables No primes Religious primes 
Neutral 
primes No primes 
Religious 
primes 
Neutral 
primes 
Constant 0.440 
(0.814) 
0.316 
(1.098) 
0.844 
(0.761) 
-0.159 
(0.723) 
1.113 
(0.867) 
0.818 
(0.834) 
itIV  1.191 
(0.075) 
1.159 
(0.115) 
1.196 
(0.066) 
0.990 
(0.061) 
1.033 
(0.087) 
1.038 
(0.080) 
Round 
dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
u  2.179 
(0.436) 
2.314 
(0.508) 
2.168 
(0.425) 
2.113 
(0.412) 
2.004 
(0.422) 
2.091 
(0.427) 
  1.898 
(0.132) 
2.927 
(0.203) 
1.674 
(0.116) 
1.548 
(0.107) 
2.219 
(0.154) 
2.038 
(0.141) 
Log-
likelihood -277.774 -324.439 -264.520 -255.925 -293.175 -284.718 
Notes: Round effects are controlled but omitted. Each column indicates a separate regression. 
Sample size is 128 for each treatment. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
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Table 6. Wald tests 
Treatments Wald test (p-value) Result 
Hypothetical 
No primes 35.93 (0.000) H0 rejected 
Religious primes 14.56 (0.104) H0 accepted 
Neutral primes 28.80 (0.001) H0 rejected 
Real 
No primes 2.49 (0.981) H0 accepted 
Religious primes 10.46 (0.314) H0 accepted 
Neutral primes 14.72 (0.098) H0 rejected 
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Table 7. Random effects regression of differences in bids and induced values 
Variables Coef. (Std. Error) 
Constant 1.588 (1.661) 
Hyp 0.595 (0.675) 
ReligPr -0.288 (2.272) 
HypReligPr -0.281 (0.983) 
NeutPr 0.184 (0.676) 
HypNeutPr 0.046 (0.949) 
Religiousness 0.038 (0.074) 
ReligiousnessReligPr -0.053 (0.123) 
Christian -1.182 (1.423) 
ChristianReligPr 2.054 (1.885) 
Atheist -0.367 (1.483) 
AtheistReligPr -0.637 (2.036) 
Donation 0.486 (0.460) 
Round dummies YES 
v  1.753 (0.158) 
e  1.955 (0.054) 
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Figure 1. Ratio of revealed demand over induced demand in % 
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Figure 2. Distribution of bids by treatment 
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 Appendix A: Priming manipulation task 
 
Please complete the following verbal fluency task. Do your best to complete every item  
Instructions:  
 
Unscramble the following groups of words to make a four word phrase or sentence by 
dropping the irrelevant word.  For example,  
 
high winds the flies plane  -->  the plane flies high  
 
Religious Primes 
1. felt she eradicate spirit the _____________________________ 
2. dessert divine was fork the _____________________________ 
3. appreciated presence was imagine her _____________________________ 
4. more paper it once do _____________________________ 
5. send I over it mailed _____________________________ 
6. evil thanks give God to _____________________________ 
7. yesterday it finished track he _____________________________ 
8. sacred was book refer the _____________________________ 
9. reveal the future simple prophets _____________________________ 
10. prepared somewhat I was retired _____________________________ 
 
 
Control Primes 
1. fall was worried she always _____________________________ 
2. shoes give replace old the _____________________________ 
3. retrace good have holiday a _____________________________ 
4. more paper it once do _____________________________ 
5. send I over it mailed _____________________________ 
6. saw hammer he the train _____________________________ 
7. yesterday it finished track he _____________________________ 
8. sky the seamless blue is _____________________________ 
9. predictable he shoes his tied_____________________________ 
10. prepared somewhat I was retired _____________________________ 
 
 
 
 
Note: Subjects did not see the words in bold but in normal font 
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Appendix B: 
 
Table B1. Random effects regressions 
 Hypothetical Real 
Variables No primes Religious primes Neutral primes No primes Religious primes Neutral primes 
Constant -5.398 
(4.478) 
-8.804 
(11.537) 
7.627 
(3.589) 
-10.866 
(7.435) 
5.558 
(5.405) 
-16.514 
(4.987) 
itIV  1.191 
(0.075) 
1.159 
(0.115) 
1.196 
(0.066) 
0.990 
(0.061) 
1.033 
(0.087) 
1.038 
(0.080) 
Age 0.108 
(0.153) 
0.141 
(0.289) 
-0.188 
(0.111) 
0.378 
(0.312) 
-0.251 
(0.180) 
0.785 
(0.173) 
Gender -0.158 
(1.266) 
1.137 
(1.473) 
1.299 
(1.210) 
-0.825 
(1.437) 
1.498 
(1.386) 
0.049 
(0.792) 
Income2 1.731 
(1.610) 
2.436 
(2.774) 
-2.581 
(1.736) 
0.468 
(2.072) 
-0.176 
(1.688) 
1.265 
(0.897) 
Income3 1.549 
(2.225) 
1.386 
(2.928) 
-1.959 
(1.777) 
1.088 
(1.805) 
-0.072 
(1.761) 
0.431 
(1.150) 
Hsize 0.592 
(0.480) 
0.902 
(1.402) 
-0.313 
(0.471) 
0.507 
(0.468) 
0.002 
(0.540) 
-0.335 
(0.446) 
Round dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
u  2.294 
(0.557) 
2.690 
(0.691) 
2.048 
(0.496) 
2.184 
(0.519) 
2.009 
(0.518) 
1.066 
(0.349) 
  1.898 
(0.132) 
2.927 
(0.203) 
1.674 
(0.116) 
1.548 
(0.107) 
2.219 
(0.154) 
2.038 
(0.141) 
Log-likelihood -272.840 -318.725 -258.942 -250.158 -287.639 -273.050 
Notes: Round effects are controlled but omitted. Each column indicates a separate regression. Sample size is 128 for each treatment. 
Standard errors in parenthesis. Gender is a dummy for males. Income2 (Income3) is a dummy indicating household’s income position is 
average (above average or better). Hsize indicates household size. 
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Table B2. Wald tests 
Treatments Wald test (p-value) Result 
Hypothetical 
No primes 38.250 (0.001) 
H0 rejected 
Religious primes 14.550 (0.410) H0 accepted 
Neutral primes 37.180 (0.001) H0 rejected 
Real 
No primes 6.580 (0.950) 
H0 accepted 
Religious primes 15.360 (0.354) H0 accepted 
Neutral primes 62.570 (0.000) H0 rejected 
 
